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No Shelter from the Storm: Undocumented
Populations and Federal Disaster Aid
Ashley Morey1
I. INTRODUCTION
In 2011, the United States experienced hurricanes, wildfires, flooding,
tornadoes, earthquakes, and droughts throughout the country.2 The
economic cost of these disasters was $35 billion—three times greater than
the average annual cost of disasters in the United States.3 Many scientists
theorize that disasters are becoming more common, or at least more severe,
due to climate change and destruction of natural barriers such as coastal
marshlands.4 Hurricane Katrina, for example, was especially severe because
the coastal marshland in Louisiana had been systematically destroyed by
development and pollution, leaving very little intact to absorb the storm
surge.5
Disasters are problematic not simply because they are becoming more
frequent and more severe, but because they can destroy infrastructure and
use up valuable resources.6 Disasters can destroy roads, levees, buildings,
and communications systems.7 Government and nongovernment
1

The author would like to thank Professor Cliff Villa for his generous and invaluable
guidance and feedback throughout the process of writing this article.
2
2011 Federal Disaster Declarations, FEMA (Mar. 15, 2012, 2:55 PM),
http://www.fema.gov/news/disasters.fema?year=2011.
3
Earthquakes Prompt Record Insurance Claims in 2011, REUTERS, Jan. 4, 2012,
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/04/us-munichre-earthquakesidUSTRE8030KM20120104.
4
ROBERT R.M. VERCHICK, FACING CATASTROPHE: ENVIRONMENTAL ACTION FOR A
POST-KATRINA WORLD 30 (2010); Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing
CLIMATE
CHANGE
SCI.
PROGRAM
1
(June
2008),
Climate,
US
http://downloads.climatescience.gov/sap/sap3-3/sap3-3-final-all.pdf.
5
VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 30–31.
6
DANIEL A. FARBER ET AL., DISASTER LAW AND POLICY 10 (2d ed. 2010).
7
Id. at 3.
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organizations can be prevented from distributing aid upon which
populations rely.8 Court systems can be caught off guard if courthouses and
records are destroyed, and this can impede access to legal remedies.9
Disasters also require coordination of emergency resources: evacuation
assistance, emergency shelter, food, and medicine. If these resources are
handled poorly or distributed slowly, people will die. The nation witnessed
this after Hurricane Katrina.10
An often-repeated sentiment in disaster law scholarship is that although
disasters are said to be “great equalizers,” they actually reinforce
disparities.11 The poor feel the impacts of disasters most acutely because
they are more likely to lack the resources (e.g., transportation and money)
needed to evacuate. Non-English speakers often have limited notice that a
dangerous situation is arising due to their lack of contact with mainstream
means of communication or because warnings are not widely disseminated
in other languages.12 Finally, the poor and minorities tend to live in the
areas most vulnerable to disaster.13
The impacts of disasters are amplified in undocumented populations. In
addition to financial and social issues that uniquely affect them,
undocumented populations are barred from receiving most kinds of federal

8

See id.
See Brandon L. Garrett & Tania Tetlow, Criminal Justice Collapse: The Constitution
After Hurricane Katrina, 56 DUKE L.J. 127, 128 (2006) (discussing how thousands of
detainees were left without remedies after Hurricane Katrina).
10
FARBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 149.
11
See id. at 204; VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 106.
12
INT’L HUMAN RIGHTS LAW CLINIC, UNIV. OF CAL. BERKELEY, BOALT HALL SCH. OF
LAW, WHEN DISASTER STRIKES: A HUMAN RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF THE 2005 GULF
COAST HURRICANES 21 (Mar. 2006), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/
IHRLC/Briefing_Paper_Report_When_Disaster_Strikes_2_Mar_06.pdf
[hereinafter
WHEN DISASTER STRIKES].
13
Susan L. Cutter, The Geography of Social Vulnerability: Race, Class, and
Catastrophe, SSRC.ORG (June 11, 2006), http://understandingkatrina.ssrc.org/Cutter/;
VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 107.
9
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aid.14 Undocumented populations also have an acute, and understandable,
fear of detention and deportation, which prevents them from utilizing
available government resources after disasters.15 The United States is home
to nearly 12 million undocumented immigrants, and neglecting them in
times of crisis is a violation of human rights.16 As disasters become more
common and more severe, the United States’ disaster policies should not be
shaped by the immigration policy debate, but rather by our commitment to
providing safety and security for all people affected by disasters.
This article addresses the issue of undocumented immigrants and disaster
aid by discussing current demographic trends, barriers to obtaining disaster
aid, current federal policies and their consequences, and the manner in
which other organizations manage these situations. It then proposes
relatively minor modifications to the existing disaster response structure
that will drastically increase the ability of undocumented immigrants to
access aid.

14

ELLEN RUTH WASEM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 33091, HURRICANE KATRINARELATED IMMIGRATION ISSUES AND LEGISLATION 3 (2005), available at
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/53687.pdf.
15
US DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., DEVELOPING CULTURAL COMPETENCE IN
DISASTER
MENTAL
HEALTH
PROGRAMS:
GUIDING
PRINCIPLES
AND
RECOMMENDATIONS 15, 28 (2003), available at http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//
SMA11-DISASTER/SMA11-DISASTER-01.pdf
[hereinafter
HHS,
CULTURAL
COMPETENCE].
16
See id.; Jeffrey S. Passel & D’Vera Cohn, A Portrait of Unauthorized Immigrants in
the United States, PEW HISP. CENTER 1 (Apr. 14, 2009), http://www.pewhispanic.org/
files/reports/107.pdf. Undocumented immigrants account for 4 percent of the overall
population in the United States, as well as 30 percent of the total foreign-born population.
Id. See also VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 186–87.
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II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. The Changing Number and Distribution of Undocumented Immigrants in
the United States
Undocumented immigrants account for 4 percent of the overall United
States population.17 As this group becomes more diverse and settles in more
states, any solution to the lack of disaster assistance for undocumented
immigrants will need to be multifaceted and complex.
The Pew Hispanic Center estimates that there are nearly 12 million
undocumented immigrants living in the United States.18 Although Mexicans
comprise 59 percent of the undocumented population, a significant number
of undocumented immigrants come from Central America (11 percent) and
South and East Asia (11 percent).19 A lesser proportion comes from South
America (7 percent), Europe and Canada (4.5 percent), the Caribbean (4
percent), and the Middle East (less than 2 percent).20
The undocumented population in the United States is also diverse in
terms of its location. While it used to be true that most undocumented
immigrants concentrated in border states, today, many immigrants move to
other regions throughout the country.21 For instance, in 1990, California
was home to 42 percent of the nation’s 3.5 million undocumented
immigrants,22 and now, California houses only 22 percent of the 11.9
million undocumented immigrants in the United States.23 Meanwhile, states
in the mid-Atlantic, Southeast, Midwest, and Mountain regions have
doubled their proportions of undocumented immigrants since 1990.24

17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

Passel & Cohn, supra note 16 at 2–3.
Id. at 1.
Id. at 21.
Id.
Id. at i.
Id. at i.
Id. at 1–2.
Id. at 2.
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B. Disparities Between Undocumented People and US-Born Residents
Undocumented immigrants face a host of issues that US-born residents
are either unlikely to encounter or tend to experience less drastically.
Undocumented immigrants often receive less education, make less money,
and are less likely to be insured than US-born residents. Additionally,
undocumented people are subject to racist and discriminatory attitudes. All
of these factors contribute to a heightened need for disaster aid.
Undocumented immigrants are considerably less likely to be educated
than US-born residents and authorized immigrants. For instance, while only
2 percent of US-born adults and 13 percent of authorized immigrants
between the ages of twenty-five and sixty-four have less than a ninth-grade
education, a staggering 29 percent of undocumented immigrants in the same
age range have not completed any high school coursework.25 The statistics
are similar across the educational spectrum for this age group: US-born
residents and authorized immigrants tend to be at least twice as likely to
have achieved every educational level.26 The trend for those between the
ages of eighteen and twenty-four is similarly shocking. While 15 percent of
authorized immigrants and 8 percent of US-born residents in this age group
have not completed high school, the proportion of undocumented
immigrants who have not completed high school is 40 percent.27
Undocumented workers are also more likely to have low-skilled jobs than
US-born residents. Less than one-third of US-born residents hold jobs in the
service, construction, production, and installation industries, whereas a full
two-thirds of undocumented immigrants hold such jobs.28 While
undocumented workers represent only 4 percent of the US population, they

25
26
27
28

Id. at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 14.
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make up 25 percent of all farm workers, 37 percent of all drywall installers,
28 percent of dishwashers, and 27 percent of housekeepers and maids.29
The combination of lack of education, low-skill jobs, and lack of status
prevents undocumented immigrants from earning as much as US-born
residents and authorized immigrants, even over time. The median income
for US-born households is $50,000 per year.30 The median income of
authorized immigrants who have been in the United States fewer than ten
years is around $41,000 per year, but after ten years in the United States,
their median income increases to about $54,000 per year.31 Alternatively,
undocumented immigrants with fewer than ten years in the United States
have a median annual household income of $33,000. Even after a decade in
the United States, the annual salaries of undocumented households
increases by only $3,000.32 The fact that undocumented immigrants tend to
have more workers per household than US-born residents makes this
disparity even more notable.33
Finally, undocumented immigrants are less likely to be covered by health
insurance than US-born residents. While 24 percent of authorized
immigrants and 14 percent of US-born adults did not have health insurance
at any time in 2007, 60 percent of undocumented adults were without health
insurance during the same period.34 Similarly, 8 percent of children of USborn parents did not have health insurance at any point in 2007, compared
with 25 percent of US-born children of undocumented parents and 45
percent of undocumented children.
These education, vocation, wage, and insurance statistics demonstrate the
challenges encountered by undocumented immigrants in the United States.
29

Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
31
Id.
32
Id.
33
Id. US born households have 1.23 workers per household, whereas households headed
by an undocumented immigrant have 1.75 workers per household. Id.
34
Id. at 18.
30
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These challenges are particularly important to note in a discussion of the
effects of disasters on undocumented immigrants. For example, lack of
money and health insurance can make recovery from, and even survival of,
a disaster considerably more difficult.
C. Barriers to Obtaining Disaster Aid
There are two primary barriers between undocumented people and
disaster aid: logistic barriers and fear-based barriers. Logistic barriers
encompass lack of information about undocumented populations, lack of
resources, poor communication, and loss of documentation or status. Fearbased barriers stem from a general distrust by undocumented people of
government authorities. This section explores how undocumented people
experience these barriers before and after a disaster.
1. Logistic Barriers
Logistic issues surrounding access to aid for undocumented people occur
before and after disasters.35 Many of the logistic barriers plague all
immigrants, particularly those with limited means or lack of Englishlanguage proficiency.36 Although these logistic barriers are not unique to
undocumented immigrants, they arguably have a harsher impact on them.37
First, there is a lack of information about undocumented populations
which affects the ability of the government to warn people about a disaster
before it happens.38 Governments, at every level, have inadequate
information about undocumented populations (as well as homeless
populations and even tourist populations) that inhabit potentially dangerous
areas, such as regions likely to be affected by hurricanes or urban areas that
35

WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 21–22.
Id.
37
See WASEM, supra note 14, at 1.
38
Susan L. Cutter, GI Science, Disasters, and Emergency Management, 7
TRANSACTIONS IN GIS 439, 443 (2003), available at http://webra.cas.sc.edu/hvri/pubs/
2003_GIScienceDisastersAndEM.pdf.
36
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might be affected by earthquakes or terrorist attacks.39 For instance, if better
information on both the sizes of undocumented populations and the best
means of communicating with undocumented populations was available,
mandatory evacuation orders would reach more people40 and local
governments would be better equipped to provide accurate information to
assisting agencies, like FEMA, which can help mobilize emergency
resources.41 And, practically speaking, first-responders would have a better
idea about where to look for people possibly trapped after a disaster.42
When governments have little information about the populations actually
inhabiting an area, governments cannot adequately plan for evacuation
before a disaster strikes. This problem affects people in two ways: first,
undocumented immigrants are effectively excluded from governmentprovided transportation and, second, undocumented immigrants without
their own transportation simply cannot evacuate.43 After Hurricane Katrina,
for instance, some estimate that around 100 thousand Latino residents
(documented and undocumented) failed to evacuate the Gulf Coast before
the storm solely because they did not have access to a vehicle.44
Second, lack of resources continues to create problems for undocumented
immigrants after a disaster has already occurred. As the National Research
Council has written about social vulnerability and disasters:
Lower-income and minority populations, who tend to have larger
families, may also be reluctant to impose on friends and relatives
for shelter. Lack of financial resources may leave less-well-off
segments of the population less able to take time off from work

39

Id.; Cara Buckley, Bill Would Aid Relatives of 9/11 Immigrant Dead, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 22, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/23/nyregion/23families.html.
40
Cutter, supra note 38, at 443.
41
See id.
42
Id.
43
See VERCHICK, supra note 4, at 121.
44
WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 7.
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when disasters threaten, to travel long distances to avoid danger, or
to pay for emergency lodging.45
The same issues that create problems in the face of disasters continue to
affect people during the response and recovery stages as well.
Third, undocumented immigrants face barriers in the realm of
communication, both in terms of language and contact. Although
immigrants from Mexico and Latin America make up the biggest group of
undocumented immigrants in the United States,46 the lack of Spanish
language resources is pervasive47 (especially considering the sheer number
of documented Spanish-speakers who also live in the United States48). As
the government was preparing for Hurricane Katrina, it neglected to issue a
warning in any language other than English in the Gulf Coast.49 Even in
Southern California, where there is a large Spanish-speaking population and
the threat of earthquakes and wildfires is high,50 there has been no serious
effort to translate materials into Spanish; most efforts are aimed at using
Spanish-language news outlets to direct pertinent information to Spanishspeaking populations.51
This problem affects documented and undocumented immigrants from
other cultures as well. In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, callers seeking
information from FEMA were given two choices: English and Spanish.52 As
45

Comm. on Disaster Research in the Soc. Sci., Facing Hazards and Disasters:
Understanding Human Dimensions, NAT’L RES. COUNCIL OF THE NAT’L ACAD. 130
(2006), http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=11671&page=R1.
46
Passel & Cohn, supra note 16, at 15.
47
Ann Bessie Matthew & Kimiko Kelly, Disaster Preparedness in Urban Immigrant
Communities: Lessons Learned from Recent Catastrophic Events and Their Relevance to
Latino and Asian Communities in Southern California, TOMÁS RIVERA POL’Y INST. &
ASIAN PAC. AM. LEGAL CENTER 6 (2008),
http://www.trpi.org/PDFs/
DISASTER_REPORT_Final.pdf.
48
Id.
49
WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 22.
50
Matthew & Kelly, supra note 47, at 6.
51
Id.
52
Jonathan Blazer & Brett Murphy, Addressing the Needs of Immigrants and Limited
English Communities in Disaster Planning and Relief: Lessons for Government, Disaster
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a result, many Vietnamese immigrants were not aware of official FEMA
shelters, and rather took shelter in “ethnic enclaves,” like the Hong Kong
City Mall in Houston, TX.53
The lack of language-specific resources causes problems beyond
evacuation.54 After disasters, non-English speakers are effectively denied
access to public health information (e.g., water safety) and information
about where to obtain disaster aid and shelter.55 This lack of information is
compounded by a lack of contact between government entities and
undocumented (and documented) populations.56
Because no official, language-specific information was disseminated
through any channels before Hurricane Katrina, immigrant communities
had to establish ad hoc methods for distributing information.57 Common
methods of dissemination include using language-specific radio
programming, religious institutions, and ethnic grocers.58 One report makes
the observation that Hurricane Katrina was one of the most devastating
disasters in US history, but immigrant populations had to rely on word-ofmouth means of transmitting information.59 Unfortunately, this pattern of
lack of contact between immigrant populations and the government repeats
itself from disaster to disaster.60
Finally, access to disaster aid is hampered by loss of documentation and
loss of status. Loss of documentation refers to the literal, physical loss of
immigration documentation.61 After disasters, many people are displaced
Relief Agencies, and Community-Based Organizations, 22 IMMIGRANTS’ RIGHTS
UPDATE 1, 7 (2008), available at http://www.ncg.org/s_ncg/assets/dpri/
NILCAddressingImmigrantsNeeds.pdf.
53
Id. at 6.
54
See WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 22.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id. at 21.
59
Id. at 22.
60
See Matthew & Kelly, supra note 47, at 7.
61
WASEM, supra note 14, at 2.

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

No Shelter From the Storm

from their homes because their homes are destroyed or because emergency
resources are only available elsewhere. Many Hurricane Katrina survivors
faced these issues, but for immigrants who physically lost their immigration
documents along with their homes, the impacts were especially
devastating.62 Immigrants who were lawfully admitted into the United
States and had work-authorization were denied the ability to obtain work
legally 63 because employers are required to verify the work eligibility of all
potential new hires, under penalty of sanction.64 Further, long-term disaster
aid requires the submission of immigration documentation.65
After disasters, not only do many authorized immigrants lack the
documentation required to obtain the aid to which they are statutorily
entitled, many face massive hurdles in terms of replacing their
documentation.66 If government buildings and other critical infrastructure
are damaged, immigrants can face lengthy delays before their
documentation is replaced.67 For example, after Hurricane Katrina, the New
Orleans court system and other basic governmental agencies were crippled
due to the widespread destruction of their buildings.68 Such bureaucratic
delays are lengthened in jurisdictions that have not adopted comprehensive
disaster mitigation strategies, which can include measures like adequately
backing up records and enabling employees to work from home.69
“Loss of status” refers to immigrants who entered the United States under
a visa requiring sponsorship.70 The United States grants a limited number of
visas each year to petitioners who have a US-citizen family member or
62

Id.
Id.
64
Immigration and Nationality Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2005).
65
Disaster Assistance Frequently Asked Questions, FEMA (June 23, 2011),
http://www.fema.gov/assistance/dafaq.shtm#citizen1.
66
WASEM, supra note 14, at 2.
67
Id.
68
See Garrett & Tetlow, supra note 9, at 56.
69
Id.
70
WASEM, supra, note 14, at 7–8.
63
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employer willing to sponsor the petitioner.71 If that family member dies in
the course of the disaster or if that business is destroyed as a result of the
disaster, then the visa holder no longer has sponsorship, and legal status is
revoked.72 The timber industry was hard hit after Hurricane Katrina, and
many workers lost their jobs and, therefore, their immigration status.73
Because of the loss of immigration status, these workers were unable to
obtain any other legal work, including work related to cleanup and
rebuilding efforts that were desperately needed after the devastating
hurricane.74
Barriers to immigrants’ access to disaster aid include lack of government
information about localized populations, lack of resources, poor
communication, and loss of documentation and status. These issues are not
always specific to undocumented immigrants; furthermore, the distinction
between documented and undocumented is not always important or clear.
The porousness of this distinction is best shown by the fact that immigrants
who physically lose their documentation as a result of a disaster effectively
become “undocumented” because they lose their ability to prove eligibility
to work and to obtain long-term aid. Similarly, authorized immigrants
whose statuses are revoked due to the effects of disasters actually become
“undocumented.”
2. Fear-Based Barriers
Many immigrants, particularly undocumented immigrants, are distrustful
of the government.75 This fear does not abate after a disaster, even when
many people experience dire need.76 There are three main fear-based
71

Id.
Id. at 8–9.
73
Elena Shore, Katrina Victims Denied Aid and Face Deportation, NEW AM. MEDIA,
(Sept.
28,
2005),
http://news.ncmonline.com/news/view_article.html?article_
id=69b9752a0c82041c78788e4390506983.
74
Id.
75
See HHS, CULTURAL COMPETENCE, supra note 15, at 14–17.
76
Id.
72
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barriers to obtaining disaster aid: (1) an anti-immigrant social and political
climate, (2) a general wariness of government interaction, and (3) a specific
fear of encountering authorities during the evacuation process.
Unfortunately, fear-based barriers often prevent undocumented immigrants
from obtaining not only government aid, but also private, nongovernmental
aid.77
The current social and political climate in the United States is hostile
towards immigration.78 Social scientists posit that the general American
attitude toward immigration changed after September 11, 2001, because
Americans became much more concerned about national security.79
Americans perceived “the threat” as originating outside the country, and, at
some point, the focus shifted to protecting the nation’s borders.80
Consequently, the attitude toward immigrants is now relatively hostile.81
The United States’ current immigration policies reflect this hostile
attitude and contribute to barriers that undocumented immigrants face in
obtaining disaster aid. The US Department of Homeland Security’s
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Department (ICE) is detaining and
deporting more undocumented immigrants each year,82 and given the
current detention rates, the fear of deportation is well founded; in 2011,
396,906 foreign nationals were deported by ICE.83 After an undocumented
immigrant is detained by ICE, a world of uncertainty unfolds: not only can

77

Id.
Regina Branton et al., All Along the Watchtower: Acculturation of Fear, Anti-Latino
Effect, and Immigration, 73 J. OF POL. 664, 677 (2011).
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
ICE Total Removals Through February 20th, 2012, ICE.GOV 1, http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/about/offices/ero/pdf/ero-removals1.pdf (last visited May 30, 2012).
83
Id.
78
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detentions last for years, but detainees do not know if, or when, they will
see their families or be able to access legal counsel.84
Distrust in the government may stem from cultural experience as well.85
If an immigrant, documented or undocumented, came from a country where
the government was unreliable or corrupt, it may be harder for that person
to trust the US government.86 After a devastating hurricane in Alabama, for
example, immigrants from Communist countries in Asia reported that they
were generally distrustful of any government.87 Perhaps more surprisingly,
many in the group surveyed were “not accustomed to receiving Government
assistance,” and simply did not seek disaster aid.88
Finally, undocumented immigrants have a particular fear of encountering
government officials during the evacuation or aid-receipt processes.89 These
fears are, unfortunately, not unfounded. After Hurricane Katrina,
undocumented immigrants were detained in both Texas and West Virginia
while using government-provided means of evacuation.90 These individuals
are now facing deportation hearings.91 As discussed below, the US
government typically does not give undocumented immigrants assurances
that they will be free from prosecution if they seek assistance after a
disaster.92 It is difficult to imagine voluntarily subjecting oneself to contact

84
See FAQ on Federal Immigration Reform, ESPERANZA IMMIGRANTS RTS. PROJECT,
http://www.esperanza-la.org/faq-re-federal-immigration-detention.html (last visited Apr.
2, 2012).
85
HHS, CULTURAL COMPETENCE, supra note 15, at 15.
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
See id.
89
See id.
90
Shore, supra note 73. The detainees in Texas allegedly voluntarily turned themselves
over to immigration authorities and the detainees in West Virginia were detained while
on an evacuation bus after one of the men was accused of attempting to assault someone.
Id. The person he allegedly tried to assault did not press charges. Id.
91
Id.
92
Id.
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with government authorities if detention and deportation could possibly
result.
All of these fear-based barriers contribute to low rates of undocumented
immigrants obtaining disaster assistance.93 After the 1994 Northridge
earthquake in California, many immigrants avoided disaster services due to
their distrust of the government and fears of detention.94 In preparation for
Hurricane Gustav in 2008, ICE said that although it would not be
conducting any immigration enforcement activities in direct conjunction
with disaster preparation or response, all people would need to register their
information with authorities at various steps in the evacuation process.95
Because such assurances are not taken seriously, given the choice between
weathering the storm and evacuating, many undocumented immigrants (and
their documented family members) do not evacuate, preferring to face
injury—or even death—rather than risk separation from their families or
deportation.96

III. EXISTING FEDERAL POLICIES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
Federal law on the subject of undocumented populations and disaster aid
is currently comprised of a patchwork of laws that fail to adequately address
the needs of some 12 million individuals living in the United States.
Because there is no congruent set of statutes that applies to undocumented
immigrants in the specific context of disasters, a rule will often be applied
in a manner that is inconsistent with another governing statute. By
exploring ambiguities in the laws that apply to immigrants and disasters,
this section details the applicable statutes and how their enforcement, or
93

HHS, CULTURAL COMPETENCE, supra note 15, at 20.
Id.
95
Angela Kelly, New Orleans Immigrants Weather the Storm, HUFFINGTON POST (Sept.
4,
2008),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/angela-kelley/new-orleans-immigrantswe_b_124103.html.
96
Id.; Editorial, Hurricanes, Citizenship, and the Makings of an Unnatural Disaster,
N.Y. TIMES, May 28, 2008, http://theboard.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/20/hurricanescitizenship-and-the-makings-of-an-unnatural-disaster/.
94
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nonenforcement, creates consequences that are both unjust and unsafe. It
then discusses several recent opportunities to specifically address the issue
of undocumented immigrants and disaster aid. Finally, this section
considers the use of agreements not to prosecute and the conference of
Temporary Protected Status in the context of disasters.
A. The Law is Ambiguous and Inconsistent
There are federal laws that apply to government aid for undocumented
immigrants in general and, likewise, there are federal laws that apply to the
government’s role before, during, and after disasters.97 The Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996
(PRWORA) governs the types of government aid for which immigrants,
documented and undocumented, are eligible.98 The Robert T. Stafford
Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988 (Stafford Act)99
governs FEMA and the types of aid available after a presidentially declared
disaster.100 This section looks at the laws that always apply, and that
sometimes apply, to undocumented immigrants in relation to disasters, with
a focus on the inconsistent results that sometimes arise.
1. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of
1996
Under PRWORA, undocumented immigrants101 are denied most federal
public benefits.102 The public benefits denied to undocumented immigrants
include “any grant, contract, loan, professional license, or commercial
97

WASEM, supra note 14, at 2.
Id.
99
FARBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 90; 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121–5208 (2009).
100
FARBER ET AL., supra note 6, at 90–91.
101
8 U.S.C. § 1611 (2012). The statute refers to undocumented immigrants as
“unqualified aliens,” which is an entire subset of statutorily defined immigrants that
includes undocumented immigrants. Id. For consistency, I will continue to use the phrase
“undocumented immigrants.”
102
Id. § 1611(a).
98
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license provided by an agency of the United States or by appropriated funds
of the United States,”103 as well as,
[a]ny retirement, welfare, health, disability, public or assisted
housing, postsecondary education, food assistance, unemployment
benefit, or any other similar benefit for which payments or
assistance are provided to an individual, household, or family
eligibility unit by an agency of the United States or by
appropriated funds of the United States.104
PRWORA not only defines “public benefit” very broadly, but it also
purports to supersede all other provisions of law.105
Despite what seems like a sweeping prohibition of federal aid for
undocumented immigrants, PRWORA does contain several important
exceptions. It allows for an exception related to disaster aid which provides
for “short-term, non-cash, in-kind disaster relief.”106 Complementing the
exception for disaster aid, PRWORA also allows undocumented immigrants
to receive most emergency medical treatment107 and public health assistance
relating to the immunization and treatment of communicable diseases.108
The US attorney general is also charged with using his or her discretion
to provide “programs, services, or assistance (such as soup kitchens, crisis
counseling and intervention, and short-term shelter)” to undocumented
immigrants.109 When implementing such services, the attorney general is
obligated to consult with governmental agencies, specifically federal
agencies that do the following:
(i) deliver in-kind services at the community level, including
through public or private nonprofit agencies; (ii) do not condition
the provision of assistance, the amount of assistance provided, or
103
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the cost of assistance provided on the individual recipient’s income
or resources; and (iii) are necessary for the protection of life or
safety.110
The attorney general is only able to use discretion when agencies or
departments meet these requirements.111 Notably, the attorney general’s
discretion does not extend to agencies that predicate public assistance on
financial need.112 As such, undocumented immigrants are barred from many
of the benefits which serve low-income populations.
Although exceptions to the ban on federal funds to undocumented
immigrants exist, PRWORA is still quite restrictive.113 It limits
undocumented immigrants to short-term, noncash aid—which excludes
funding to rebuild, evacuate using means other than government-sponsored
transportation, or even purchase groceries and supplies.114
2. The Stafford Act and FEMA Programs
The Stafford Act (administered by FEMA) lays out the procedures for
declaring a disaster, which is important because many of the Act’s
provisions are not triggered until a disaster115 has been declared.116 In order
for a disaster to be declared, the governor of the affected state must petition
the president to declare a disaster.117 The governor must find “that the
110
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disaster is of such severity and magnitude that effective response is beyond
the capabilities of the State and the affected local governments and that
Federal assistance is necessary.”118 The governor must also show that he or
she has complied with the state’s emergency management protocols and
that the state will comply with the Stafford Act’s cost-sharing
requirements.119 Even after a state has satisfied these requirements, the
president has discretion over whether to declare a disaster.120
When the disaster has been declared, the federal government may provide
states with assistance in many forms. States may be able to utilize, with or
without a reimbursement requirement, resources from federal agencies in all
manners, from supplies and facilities to technical and advisory assistance.121
FEMA is allowed to directly administer its programs in the affected state, or
it can provide funding to the state and allow it to administer the benefits.122
While FEMA has assistance programs for small businesses and
communities to recover and continue providing essential services,123 this
article is concerned with the specific types of aid available to individuals
who are affected by disasters. Essentially, FEMA provides short-term and
long-term aid to disaster victims, but the availability of aid for
undocumented immigrants varies considerably.
FEMA provides short-term aid that is available regardless of one’s
immigration status.124 The aid “warns people about dangers, helps them
leave dangerous places, and searches for lost people and rescues them.
FEMA also provides transportation, emergency medical care, crisis
counseling, and emergency shelter to whomever needs them. And it
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provides emergency food, water, medicine, and other supplies to meet
disaster victims’ basic needs.”125 This sort of aid does not include cash
benefits because FEMA must comply with PRWORA requirements, as
discussed above.126
The receipt of long-term aid is contingent on immigration status. Longterm aid includes cash benefits as well as aid directed toward repairing or
replacing one’s home.127 It can also include nonemergency medical
expenses, clean-up, and legal fees.128 This sort of aid is “restricted,”
meaning one must be either a US citizen or a “qualified alien” to receive the
assistance.129 Undocumented immigrants cannot obtain this sort of aid
unless they are applying on behalf of their minor children who are US
citizens.130
FEMA does not have a specific policy when it comes to its treatment of
undocumented immigrants’ personal information.131 After 9/11 and after
Hurricane Charley in 2004, FEMA announced that it would refrain from
sharing an individual’s immigration status, but such assurances are not
made regularly, leading to the conclusion that FEMA does not have a policy
on which undocumented immigrants or their advocates can rely.132 This is
particularly problematic because FEMA is an agency within the Department
of Homeland Security (DHS), which also houses ICE.133 Considering the
close proximity of these two agencies, it seems necessary to have a strict
confidentiality procedure in place for FEMA.
125
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3. Issue of Aid to Undocumented Immigrants Has Not Been Addressed
Despite Opportunities to Do So
After Hurricane Katrina, the Stafford Act was amended by the PostKatrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (Post-Katrina Act).134
Mainly as a response to 9/11, FEMA was reorganized to address the threat
of terrorism.135 After the 2005 disaster response to Katrina, Congress
restructured FEMA by elevating its position within the DHS and by giving
the FEMA administrator a direct link to the president.136
The Post-Katrina Act reiterated FEMA’s goals and made it clear that
FEMA is meant to prepare and respond to national disasters of any kind:
The primary mission of the Agency is to reduce the loss of life and
property and protect the Nation from all hazards, including natural
disasters, acts of terrorism, and other man-made disasters, by
leading and supporting the Nation in a risk-based, comprehensive
emergency management system of preparedness, protection,
response, recovery, and mitigation.137
By reiterating FEMA’s broad focus in the Post-Katrina Act, Congress
demonstrated that disaster response is a priority in the federal government.
The Post-Katrina Act addressed other concerns related to disaster
response, such as banning discrimination based on English proficiency.138
The Stafford Act now prohibits discrimination based on “race, color,
religion, nationality, sex, age, disability, English proficiency, or economic
status.”139 The Post-Katrina Act also explicitly requires the FEMA
Administrator to identify Limited English Proficiency (LEP) populations in
areas vulnerable to disasters.140 The Post-Katrina Act requires the
government to communicate with LEP populations by means which these
134
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populations understand.141 FEMA, however, has discretion over
determining how many people constitute a “population,” so if FEMA
determines that there are too few people with limited English in an area, it
remains exempt from providing information in the LEP population’s
language.142
The Post-Katrina Act represented an excellent opportunity to modify the
law of disaster response in a way that allowed better coverage for more
people. Indeed, requiring non-English materials for disaster victims is a
good, but not perfect, step toward providing information to undocumented
populations. The Act could have been amended to address undocumented
immigrants specifically, and failing to do so ensures that a large number of
people are excluded from certain kinds of benefits and even protection from
prosecution after a disaster.
4. The Government Inconsistently Grants Temporary Protected Status
and Agreements Not to Prosecute
After a disaster, the attorney general and the DHS secretary have the
ability to ensure that undocumented immigrants, or the people who employ
them, will not be prosecuted for immigration violations.143 These
agreements, however, are provided inconsistently and, thus, do not provide
any real benefit to disaster victims. This section explores the kinds of
protection available to employers and individuals when the disaster occurs
both without and within the borders of the United States.
The attorney general or the DHS secretary has the ability to assure
employers that they will not be targeted for employing undocumented
immigrants after a disaster.144 The Immigration and Nationality Act (INA)
requires employers to verify the alienage of potential employees.145 This
141
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requirement applies to foreign nationals as well as to citizens, and it makes
it illegal for employers to hire employees without first verifying their
employment eligibility.146 The attorney general and the DHS secretary have
the ability to waive this requirement by assuring employers that they will
not be prosecuted for failing to verify alienage and employment
eligibility.147
After Hurricane Katrina, DHS announced that it would not initiate
employer sanctions for forty-five days.148 This announcement made no
mention of protection for undocumented immigrants directly, but it was
enough to create an uptick in immigration, particularly of Latinos, to New
Orleans after the storm.149 Because employers were assured they would not
be prosecuted, employers were actually actively seeking undocumented
laborers to assist with the rebuilding effort.150
Although offering employers assurance that they will not be prosecuted
for employing undocumented immigrants may seem like a decent solution,
in practice it actually allows for exploitation and the furtherance of
discriminatory attitudes.151 After Katrina, when employers were assured
they would not be prosecuted, employers in many states hired
undocumented workers to do hard clean-up jobs for up to eighty hours per
week at a rate of $8–12 per hour.152 Due to the chaotic circumstances, there
is little data relating to whether employees were provided with any safety
equipment to protect them from toxic debris.153 Further, there are reports of
146
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undocumented immigrants receiving less pay than promised, or no pay at
all, for which there is little recourse.154
After the federal government agreed not to prosecute and the number of
immigrants rose in the Gulf States, so did the prevalence of
discrimination.155 While speaking with a group of local business owners,
New Orleans Mayor Ray Nagin asked, “How do I make sure New Orleans
is not overrun with Mexican workers?”156 While his city was being cleaned
up and rebuilt by Latino immigrants, Mayor Nagin still expressed such
sentiments. Although he attempted to distance himself from his comments,
those words have often been repeated to illustrate the prevailing
discriminatory attitudes post disaster.157
The federal government has the ability to provide direct assurances to
immigrants living in the United States when the disaster occurs in a foreign
country.158 Temporary Protected Status (TPS) ensures that immigrants are
not forced to return to their home nation when that nation is unstable due to
a disaster.159 While the goal is to protect immigrants with expired visas,
TPS is also available to all undocumented immigrants from nations the
United States deems unsafe. The undocumented immigrants, however, must
apply for TPS, which means they must register with DHS.160
TPS has been conferred many times by the federal government to
immigrants from certain countries. TPS is considered when US officials feel
that deporting foreign nationals would be dangerous.161 For instance, it was
conferred upon foreign nationals of various Central American nations after
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Hurricane Mitch in 1998.162 After the Haitian earthquake in 2010, Haitian
nationals living in the United States were granted TPS. Although the status
was set to expire, DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano extended it because
conditions in Haiti had not improved.163 Most recently, Secretary
Napolitano granted TPS to Syrians living in the United States.164 TPS can
be conferred for a variety of reasons and can be extended if the conditions
in the foreign country do not improve, which demonstrates the program’s
flexibility.165
When the disaster takes place inside the United States, however, there are
no official, discretionary actions that the attorney general or DHS secretary
can take to grant TPS to undocumented immigrants.166 In fact, there are
very few instances of undocumented immigrants obtaining amnesty or some
sort of protected status in the wake of disasters that occurred in the United
States. Even after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, two of the most iconic and
devastating natural disasters in recent history, undocumented immigrants
were never promised freedom from prosecution, either in terms of
evacuation or employment.167
After September 11th, however, Congress decided to grant amnesty to
undocumented immigrants who had been victims of the attack.168
Additionally, undocumented immigrants were not denied financial
162
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compensation. They were able to participate in the September 11th Victims
Compensation Fund, and were provided with free 9/11-related healthcare
without having to provide documentation.169 Certainly the benefits
conferred after 9/11 are different because they were largely within the
context of a bill to bailout the airline industry,170 but is one disaster really so
different from another?
B. Consequences Are Unsafe and Unjust
The consequences of these policies are both unsafe and unjust. Although
FEMA is now required to provide language-specific information for LEP
populations, it continues to struggle with disseminating information to
disaster victims.171 Even if FEMA were able to provide perfect information
to LEP populations, there are still no policies to cure the fundamental lack
of trust in the government that many immigrants have; thus, the barriers to
obtaining disaster aid have not been removed.172 FEMA, which has only
recently been prohibited from discriminating based on language, must
overcome a long history of discrimination173 in order to gain the trust of the
populations it is statutorily required to serve under the Stafford Act.174
Granting immunity from prosecution to employers who hire
undocumented workers after a disaster, while neglecting to provide such
assurances to individuals, further enforces the employer’s superior
bargaining power.175 Instances of exploitation tend to be rampant after
disasters, and are well-documented in employment relationships.176
169
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Additionally, providing assurances only to employers sends the message
that it is only undocumented immigrants that are doing something illegal
while employers are simply given a free pass in terms of verifying
documentation.177 This message reinforces discriminatory attitudes and
relationships.178
Inconsistently granting TPS, amnesty, or agreements not to prosecute
exacerbates fear in an already traumatic situation.179 It reinforces the idea
that governments are not trustworthy and that laws are unequally applied.180
It is also fundamentally unfair to privilege the victims of one disaster over
the victims of another disaster. The victims of hurricanes are equally
deserving of amnesty and non-prosecution agreements as are the victims of
9/11. Likewise, from a human rights perspective, undocumented immigrants
who are the victims of disasters that take place in the United States are no
less deserving of assistance than are foreign nationals whose home
countries experience disasters.181
As a result of these policies, undocumented immigrants do not evacuate
and do not seek disaster aid because there is little communication about the
kinds of aid available and undocumented immigrants are unwilling to
register with the state.182 Furthermore, organizations providing assistance
and guidance to undocumented immigrants are ill-equipped to give good
advice regarding the best course of action after a disaster. It is unknown
how an agency like FEMA will treat an undocumented person’s
information, or whether it is working in tandem with ICE, also a DHS
agency.183 The current federal policies have been revised, but not enough;
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the current policies leave in place most of the barriers to obtaining disaster
aid that undocumented immigrants face.

IV. HOW OTHER ORGANIZATIONS RESPOND TO UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS
Other organizations, both within the government and in the private
sector, also contend with how to include undocumented immigrants in
programs without disclosing immigration status to ICE. This section
discusses some of the more successful models used by agencies and private
entities, with a close look at the US Census Bureau and the American Red
Cross, as well as the ideals espoused in the UN’s Guiding Principles on
Internally Displaced Persons.
A. Government Agencies
US government agencies must reconcile their missions, which are often
related to serving and keeping safe the population, with restrictions on aid
to undocumented people.184 The PRWORA, discussed above, severely
limits the amount and kind of aid available to undocumented people living
in the United States.185 Government agencies must also decide how to treat
information supplied by undocumented immigrants. Such information is not
treated consistently among the various agencies, and there is no governing
statute in place.186
The Census Bureau has the most restrictive confidentiality policy.187 The
Census Bureau’s mission is to accurately and completely obtain information
for statistical purposes.188 It is required to keep information about
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individuals absolutely private. This restriction applies to every Census
Bureau employee for life, and there is a severe penalty for violations.189
The goal of the Census Bureau is fundamentally different than the goal of
FEMA. The Census Bureau is only concerned with accurately counting the
people within the United States, while FEMA is charged with helping
communities to plan for, respond to, and recover from disasters. Unlike
FEMA, the Census Bureau is in no way concerned with distributing aid.190
Despite this fundamental difference, the policies of FEMA should be
similar to those of the Census Bureau because neither organization is
concerned with prosecuting undocumented immigrants. Recent amendments
to the Stafford Act demonstrate that FEMA is expected to carry out its
mandate without regard to an individual’s status, but in order to remove
existing fear-based barriers, FEMA must adopt a strict policy of
confidentiality so undocumented immigrants, as well as citizens and
authorized immigrants with undocumented family members, are able to feel
secure in obtaining life-saving aid.
B. Private Entities
Private entities have far more flexibility in terms of providing aid and not
requiring immigration documentation. Because they are not bound by the
strict constraints of the PRWORA, private entities may provide many kinds
of aid to undocumented people.191 Private organizations are the best
resource available to undocumented immigrants after a disaster, and the
American Red Cross presents, despite some instances of discrimination,192
an excellent example of how to fairly provide aid to undocumented
immigrants.193
189
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The American Red Cross emphasizes providing humanitarian aid.194
Because it keeps this focus central, it is able to treat information about
immigration status with respect, offer many kinds of relief, and mobilize
effectively to serve vulnerable populations.195 When interviewing disaster
victims, the American Red Cross does not ask for information regarding
immigration status.196 Unlike FEMA, the Red Cross simply does not require
such information.197 Further, the American Red Cross has a strict policy that
if information regarding immigration status is disclosed to a Red Cross
employee, that information is neither shared nor recorded.198
The American Red Cross also provides many kinds of services,
regardless of whether a disaster victim is an undocumented immigrant.199
The benefits available from the American Red Cross include shelter,
medical care, mental health care, and even cash benefits to “pay for
groceries, new clothes, rent, emergency home repairs, transportation,
medicines, and tools.”200 The American Red Cross helps to fill the
significant gap left by the federal government’s strict policies denying such
aid to undocumented immigrants.201
Finally, the American Red Cross model allows for flexibility to meet the
varying needs of specific populations.202 It is a large organization with
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many chapters, including international chapters.203 After wildfires in
California, the American Red Cross did not have the resources to meet the
needs of Spanish-language-only populations.204 To remedy this situation,
the local Red Cross chapter enlisted the help of the Mexican chapter of the
Red Cross, which was able to supply Spanish-speaking aid workers and
Spanish-language materials to victims.205 This scenario demonstrates that
the American Red Cross is able to adapt and utilize resources in a way that
actually keeps disaster victims at the center of the conversation.
As a final note, there are documented instances in which the Red Cross
has discriminated based on language or national origin, particularly after
Hurricane Katrina.206 These instances, while certainly disappointing, seem
to be isolated and not the norm. If anything, these instances further
demonstrate the need for reform in terms of the universal availability of
disaster aid.
C. The United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons
The United Nations has established guiding principles for the treatment
of internally displaced persons (IDPs) that are “consistent with international
human rights law and international humanitarian rights law.”207 IDPs
include those who has been forced to leave their homes as the result of
“armed conflict, situations of generalized violence, violations of human
rights or natural or human-made disasters, and who have not crossed an
internationally recognized State border.”208 The principles, which include
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the right to food, shelter, and medical services,209 are to be provided to all
IDPs without discrimination, specifically including race- and status-based
discrimination.210 The principles also specify that IDPs should be able to
remain with their families, have freedom of movement throughout the
country, and be “protected from discriminatory arrest and detention as a
result of their displacement.”211
Although these guiding principles are legally unenforceable, the United
States should use the sentiment behind the guiding principles to shape its
disaster response policies.212 The US Agency for International Aid (USAID)
already uses these principles when establishing response plans in
international areas that have been affected by disasters and conflicts.213 Use
of the UN guiding principles to shape disaster policy would promote a
scheme in which it would be impermissible for the US government to
discriminate against and detain undocumented immigrants after a
disaster.214 Two key reasons support this proposition: first, USAID requires
other countries to follow the principles, and the United States should
practice what it preaches;215 second, as Robert R.M. Verchick writes,
fairness requires “stay[ing] informed about the needs of others and
[treating] them as your own.”216

V. DISCUSSION OF A PROPOSED SOLUTION FOR FEMA
As the previous sections illustrate, there are many gaps and inequalities
in the administration of disaster aid to undocumented populations. Not only
would amending the Stafford Act and improving communication with and
209
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outreach to undocumented communities help fill those gaps, but such
measures might also facilitate government entities’ fulfillment of their
humanitarian missions. Improving access to disaster aid might also provide
for stronger communities.
A. Amend the Stafford Act
The Stafford Act, although it has been amended recently, should be
further changed to allow for better implementation of disaster response
policies. This section discusses three recommendations: (1) remove FEMA
from DHS control completely; (2) keep any information collected about
immigration status strictly confidential; and (3) allow a presidential disaster
declaration to automatically trigger protection from detention and
deportation for undocumented immigrants who are victims of the disaster.
1. Remove FEMA from DHS Control
The Post-Katrina Act elevated FEMA’s status within the DHS,217 but it
should have removed it from DHS completely because DHS should not be
home to agencies whose missions are completely discrete. FEMA, an
agency that is charged with providing disaster preparation and relief, has
goals that are fundamentally different than those of ICE, which include
enforcing immigration laws and keeping US borders safe.218 Essentially,
ICE’s enforcement duties conflict with FEMA’s humanitarian mission
because it could be in a position to prosecute the very people FEMA is
charged with assisting.219
Separating FEMA completely from DHS will not be particularly difficult
because it has a history as a standalone entity.220 Before DHS was
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established in 2002, FEMA was completely independent.221 Furthermore,
due to recent reorganization, FEMA is now fairly independent within DHS,
and, for instance, has its own administrator with a direct link to the
president and Congress.222 Any criticism that it would be too cumbersome
to reorganize FEMA to be completely independent from DHS should
simply be met with a recitation of FEMA’s history as an independent
agency.
2. Keep Any Information Collected About Immigration Status
Confidential
The Stafford Act should also be explicitly amended to keep information
related to immigration status confidential. Specifically, the Stafford Act
should recognize the precarious situations in which many disaster victims
find themselves, and should refrain from asking about immigration status
altogether. FEMA should adopt the policies of the Red Cross and refrain
from recording information relating to status.
Disregarding or keeping confidential the immigration status of disaster
victims confidential has two key benefits. First, undocumented immigrants
will be more likely to feel safe, and will be more likely to come forward,
participate in evacuations, and request aid. Second, if information about
immigration status is not collected, it will be more difficult to enforce the
strict aid-related limits imposed by the PRWORA and undocumented
immigrants would be more likely to obtain long-term and cash aid. These
benefits further the ultimate goal of all disaster relief efforts, which is to
improve quality of life for disaster victims.
Ideally, FEMA would refrain from considering any information related to
immigration status, but even if it were to continue to consider this
information, it should ensure that the information is kept unequivocally
confidential. This solution would not allow undocumented immigrants to
221
222
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receive long-term or cash aid, but it would, for example, provide security
for undocumented parents who apply on behalf of citizen children. While
this is not the ideal solution, it is certainly an improvement over the current
policy.
Some may argue that allowing undocumented immigrants to receive aid
without providing documentation, or that even forcing FEMA to keep
immigration status information confidential, is wrongfully allowing
undocumented immigrants to benefit at the expense of taxpayers. However,
undocumented immigrants, regardless of one’s views on immigration
policy, are still victims of disasters and should be treated in a way that
maximizes safety and health. In its most benign form, this suggestion
simply allows undocumented immigrants to claim benefits to which they
are entitled under the current state of the law, but without fear of detention
as a direct result of seeking disaster relief.
3. Allow a Presidential Disaster Declaration to Automatically Trigger
Protection for Undocumented Immigrants Who Are Victims of the
Disaster
A presidential disaster declaration should automatically trigger TPS, or
something similar, for undocumented immigrants who are victims of a
disaster. There are three key benefits of this sort of program. First,
eliminating some fear and uncertainty after a disaster will promote
participation of undocumented immigrants in the disaster response process.
Second, undocumented immigrants will be able to participate in rebuilding
efforts without experiencing high rates of exploitation. Third, communities
will be strengthened when all people are able to participate in the rebuilding
effort.
As discussed previously,223 many undocumented immigrants are unlikely
to use government channels to receive aid for fear-based reasons. Allowing
undocumented immigrants some kind of TPS, ideally one in which
223
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individuals are not required to register with the Immigration and
Nationalization Service (INS), will help alleviate the fear that many
undocumented individuals have of encountering government officials while
evacuating or staying in shelters. It will also alleviate the fear that
undocumented members of families will be separated. Robert R. M.
Verchick suggests that developing disaster-specific policies before a
disaster actually occurs will increase certainty and response times.224 In his
example, ICE would have an established policy for evacuations, which
would avoid “last-minute wrangling between social activists and
immigration officials about document checks.”225
If a firm, established policy was effectively communicated to immigrant
populations, it would help undocumented immigrants by increasing
certainty that they would not be detained while evacuating and, thus,
encourage swift action to find safety.226 After Hurricane Gustav, DHS
announced that it would allow immigrants to use public transportation to
evacuate, but activists said this announcement came too late.227 While
advocates would have preferred to send people into immigrant communities
to explain DHS’s statement in person, they settled on making
announcements on Spanish-language radio stations.228 Had the policy been
in place before the evacuation was imminent, many more communities
could have been notified.229
After disasters that take place inside the United States, undocumented
immigrants are usually not given TPS although they themselves are victims.
When employers are occasionally given assurances that they will not be
224
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prosecuted for INA violations, the result is an influx of undocumented
workers in communities.230 However, the effect is a shadow community that
ends up doing difficult post-disaster labor and can be exploited.231 Allowing
TPS for undocumented immigrants after disasters may help to eliminate
exploitation and unsafe working conditions after disasters because the
process would be completely legal and transparent.
Finally, allowing undocumented immigrants to safely participate in the
community rebuilding process benefits everyone because communities can
be rebuilt faster.232 Further, providing a legitimate framework where
undocumented immigrants are not afraid of detainment and deportation can
result in communities that are better integrated.233 This effect was partially
illustrated when DHS agreed not to prosecute employers after Hurricane
Katrina, but the stigma inflicted on the undocumented workers themselves
remained, as evidenced by increased hostility toward immigrants now that
construction jobs are available.234 Allowing for a completely legal situation
will help eliminate that stigma, enabling undocumented immigrants to
benefit in the very communities they are helping to rebuild.
Critics of the suggestion to allow something like TPS for undocumented
disaster victims following a presidential disaster declaration will also argue
that undocumented immigrants would wrongfully benefit from the aid. This
argument ignores the fact that undocumented immigrants will actually
participate in rebuilding efforts. It is neither fair nor just to allow
undocumented immigrants to complete the difficult and dangerous work of
cleaning and rebuilding a disaster-stricken area while in fear of detention.
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Additionally, without TPS, there is an opportunity for the unscrupulous to
exploit undocumented immigrants who have little viable recourse.
B. Improve Communication and Outreach in Undocumented Communities
FEMA should also improve communication and outreach in
undocumented populations. The Red Cross provides an excellent example
of how to do this.235 The Red Cross has used an inter-agency approach to
reach vulnerable populations with great results.236 FEMA should collaborate
with agencies—federal, state, and local—to learn about undocumented
populations before a disaster strikes and to provide assistance to those
populations after a disaster strikes.
FEMA needs to learn more about undocumented populations, especially
those that are in places likely to be affected by a disaster. It needs to learn
where these populations are located, how many people live in the areas, and
how to best communicate with them so they can adequately plan for
evacuations and adequately inform the populations.
FEMA also needs to tailor its practices to meet the needs of
undocumented populations. After Hurricane Katrina, many immigrants
chose ethnic centers over official shelters, and many such immigrants
cannot remember a government official ever visiting their ad hoc shelters.237
In addition to simply considering undocumented populations in disaster
planning, FEMA needs to be proactive in preparing language- and culturespecific announcements and flyers, and in using methods of mass
communication that will be heard by undocumented populations.238

235

Brenda Muñiz, In the Eye of the Storm: How the Government and Private Response
To Hurricane Katrina Failed Latinos, NAT’L COUNCIL OF LA RAZA 19 (2006)
http://www.fachc.org/pdf/mig_ncla_Katrina_Report_FINAL.pdf.
236
See Weaver, supra note 202.
237
WHEN DISASTER STRIKES, supra note 12, at 22.
238
David Vlahov et al., Strategies for Improving Influenza Immunization Rates Among
Hard-to-Reach Populations, 84(4) J. FOR URB. HEALTH 615 (2007).

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

No Shelter From the Storm

Critics may argue that it is too cumbersome to require FEMA to improve
outreach and communication with undocumented populations. There are
two key responses to this argument. First, the Post-Katrina Act already
imposes this duty on FEMA. Second, FEMA is meant to provide a
coordinational framework between agencies and organizations to facilitate
disaster response, relief, and recovery. Hence, of any agency currently
operating, it should be the least cumbersome for FEMA to utilize the skills
and resources of other groups.

VI. CONCLUSION
Undocumented immigrants make up 4 percent of the US population.239
Current census information indicates that many undocumented immigrants
have families that are established in the United States, or are part of families
that are comprised of both authorized immigrants or citizens and
undocumented immigrants.240 There is also a significant level of disparity in
terms of education and income that plagues undocumented immigrants, and
as such, they are some of the people most vulnerable to disasters.
Further, undocumented immigrants face many barriers to obtaining
disaster assistance. Logistic barriers range from inability to communicate in
English or through “regular” channels to physical loss of documentation
paperwork after a disaster. Other barriers are based on fear of government
interaction, which is a real and legitimate concern. These barriers prevent
undocumented immigrants from receiving aid after disasters.
Our current federal policies contribute to these barriers and recent
reforms do little to remove them. The PRWORA effectively prohibits the
federal government from providing undocumented immigrants with
substantial aid, the Stafford Act does not require FEMA to provide all kinds
of aid regardless of status or even to keep information regarding status
confidential, and there is no clear guideline for conferring a protected
239
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immigration status on undocumented immigrants after disasters. Despite
opportunities to change these policies, they remain in place and prevent
undocumented immigrants from obtaining aid.
In order to remedy some of these problems, FEMA should be removed
from the DHS to prevent a conflict of interest with ICE and its enforcement
mandates, immigration status should not be used as a factor in determining
eligibility for any kind of FEMA disaster aid, TPS should be automatically
conferred when the president declares a disaster, and FEMA should rework
its communication and outreach practices to include (and better serve)
undocumented populations. To do all of these things, FEMA should look to
the policies of agencies such as the US Census Bureau and organizations
like the American Red Cross.
Disasters are tragic events, but they are made more tragic by the ways in
which our federal government responds to them. Instead of allowing
disaster response to become an opportunity to demonstrate a “tough stance”
on immigration, disaster response should center on offering comprehensive
aid to every victim. It is patently unjust to allow immigration politics or fear
to prevent people from seeking aid that would ultimately allow individuals,
families, and communities to most effectively recover from disasters,
whether they be natural or man-made.

STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP

